Shamir, SLIP-39 & splitting schemes
A single seed phrase is a single point of failure: one copy lost is a disaster, one copy found is a theft. Splitting schemes trade simplicity for resilience. Here is every mainstream option, how it actually works, and where people get burnt.
Last fact-checked 25 October 2026 (time-sensitive claims re-checked against the linked sources).
Which standard is my backup? Beginner
Before you split, convert or inherit a backup, find out which format it is. The same English words can belong to several incompatible schemes.
| What you see | Most likely | How to tell | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 12, 15, 18, 21 or 24 words | BIP39 (most wallets) | Words from the 2,048-word list. The wallet that created it should say "BIP39" or "recovery phrase". | BIP39 |
| 12 words created by Electrum (version 2.0 or later) | Electrum seed | Same 2,048-word English list, but with a version number hidden in a hash of the words. Electrum does not generate BIP39 seeds. | Electrum |
| 24 words from a Lightning node running LND | aezeed | Uses the BIP39 English list, but the words are an encrypted "cipher seed" with a version and wallet birthday. Not BIP39. | LND |
| 20 or 33 words, several cards | SLIP-39 shares | A separate 1,024-word list. All shares of one backup start with the same two words; shares in the same group share the first three. | SLIP-39 |
| 25 words (or 16 words) from a Monero wallet | Monero mnemonic (or Polyseed) | The official wallet's 25th word is a checksum. 16-word phrases embed the restore height. | Moneropedia |
A string beginning ms1 | Codex32 (BIP-93) | Bech32-style characters. Share index s is the full secret; other letters are shares. | BIP-93, COLDCARD |
Text such as wsh(sortedmulti(…))#… or tr(…) | Output descriptor | Describes which addresses a wallet uses. Not a spending secret unless it contains private keys (xprv), but essential for multisig. | BIP380 |
At a glance
| Scheme | Threshold? | What is split | Single point of failure at signing? | Wallet support | Complexity |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SLIP-39 (Shamir Backup) | M-of-N (+ groups) | The backup of one master secret | Yes — secret reassembled on one device | Trezor, Keystone, OneKey; Sparrow, Electrum, others for import | Medium |
| Multisig (e.g. 2-of-3) | M-of-N | Spending authority (separate keys) | No — keys never meet | Bitcoin: most hardware wallets + coordinators; EVM: Safe | Higher |
| Codex32 (BIP-93) | k-of-n | BIP32 master seed, by hand | Yes | Limited: COLDCARD, Bitcoin Knots; Sparrow imports the full secret only | High (manual) |
| Seed XOR | N-of-N only | A BIP39 seed into valid BIP39 parts | Yes | COLDCARD; paper method | Medium |
| Seed + passphrase stored apart | 2-of-2 | Two independent secrets | Yes | Universal | Low |
| Cutting words in half | — | The words themselves | — | — | Do not do this |
Shamir's Secret Sharing — the idea Intermediate
Invented by Adi Shamir in 1979. A secret is encoded as a point on a random polynomial; each share is another point. Any M points reconstruct the polynomial (and secret); fewer than M reveal nothing at all about it — unlike cutting words, where each piece leaks information.
SLIP-39 (Trezor "Shamir Backup" / "Multi-share Backup") Intermediate
SLIP-39 is SatoshiLabs' open standard for Shamir shares written as words. Key facts:
- Good randomness is needed twice: for the master secret and for the share values when it is split (see SLIP-39 randomness).
- Shares are 20 words (128-bit secret) or 33 words (256-bit) from a separate 1,024-word list where every word has a unique four-letter prefix and words were chosen to be hard to confuse.
- Up to 16 shares with any threshold (e.g. 2-of-3, 3-of-5). A strong RS1024 checksum (3 words) catches typos far better than BIP39.
- Trezor Safe 3, Safe 5, Safe 7 and Model T (firmware 2.7.2+) support Multi-share; a 20-word single-share backup created on firmware 2.7.2 or later (June 2024 onwards) can be upgraded to multi-share without moving funds. Older 20-word SLIP-39 backups and 12- or 24-word BIP39 backups cannot be upgraded; you must create a new wallet and move the funds (Trezor SLIP39 FAQ, Trezor: upgrading to Multi-share). Trezor lists multi-share support in Rabby, Electrum, Sparrow, BlueWallet, Wasabi and NuFi software wallets and in OneKey and Keystone hardware wallets; check the exact version before relying on it.
- A SLIP-39 secret is not interchangeable with a BIP39 phrase: you cannot type SLIP-39 shares into a BIP39-only wallet (Ledger, BitBox02, etc.).
Groups (advanced) Expert
SLIP-39 supports two levels: e.g. "2 of these 3 groups", where group A is "1-of-1 (you)", group B is "2-of-3 (family)", group C is "1-of-2 (lawyers)". Powerful for estates, but every extra layer is something your heirs must understand.
Pros
- No single share reveals anything
- Survives loss of N−M shares
- Better wordlist and checksum than BIP39
- Single-sig simplicity on-chain (normal fees, normal addresses)
- Open standard; software recovery possible
Cons
- Secret is rebuilt in one place (device) to sign or restore
- Fewer devices support it than BIP39
- Shares can't be "revoked" — a leaked share stays valid until you move funds
- A single compromised device still compromises everything
Common pitfalls
- Assuming any wallet can read shares
- Firmware compatibility: newer Trezor multi-share backups initially couldn't be imported by Keystone firmware (GitHub issue)
- Storing threshold-many shares in one building
- Not labelling shares (which scheme, threshold, group)
Expert & community advice
- Generic SSS critiques: Lopp/Casa "SSS shortcomings", Bitcoin Wiki "Shamir Secret Snakeoil" — they argue for multisig for large sums
- Trezor's view and details: Multi-share guide
- Label each share "Share x of N, threshold M, SLIP-39"
Multisig (multi-signature) Intermediate
Instead of splitting one secret, multisig uses several independent keys, each with its own seed, on separate devices. The blockchain itself enforces "M of N signatures required". Typical personal setup: 2-of-3; high-value: 3-of-5.
Pros
- Keys never meet — no single device can steal funds
- Mix device brands to hedge firmware/RNG bugs
- Lose or leak one key: sweep to a new setup calmly
- Fits collaborative custody and inheritance services
Cons
- More devices, more backups, more to explain
- Must back up the descriptor/xpubs — seeds alone are not enough
- Slightly higher fees
- Per-chain: Bitcoin multisig ≠ Ethereum Safe
Common pitfalls
Expert & community advice
- 10x Security Guide — why multisig
- Verify every address and transaction on the device screens
- Rehearse recovery of the whole quorum yearly
Shamir vs multisig — head to head
| Item | SLIP-39 Shamir | Multisig |
|---|---|---|
| Protects backups from single loss/theft | Yes | Yes |
| Protects against a single compromised signing device | No | Yes |
| Vendor diversity | Limited (few SLIP-39 devices) | Easy |
| On-chain footprint / fees | Normal single-sig | Larger, slightly higher fees (less with Taproot/MuSig-style schemes) |
| Extra data to back up | None | Descriptor/xpubs |
| Multi-coin | Yes (one secret, all coins) | Per chain |
| Ease for heirs | Collect M shares, restore on one device | Need M devices/seeds + descriptor + coordinator software |
Multisig recovery: what you need, and what happens without the descriptor Expert
A multisig address commits to every participant's public key, not just the ones that sign. To spend, a wallet must rebuild the full script, so a 2-of-3 recovery needs two signing keys and all three public keys (Unchained: wallet configurations, Bitcoin Stack Exchange).
| Item | Why it is needed | Secret? |
|---|---|---|
| M seeds (plus any passphrases), or M working devices | To sign: M of N signatures | Yes |
| The wallet descriptor (configuration file) | Records the threshold, script type, every xpub with its fingerprint and derivation path, and key ordering, in one checksummed string (BIP380 family) | No, but it reveals your balance and history |
| Coordinator software | Builds and broadcasts the transaction, e.g. Sparrow, Electrum or Bitcoin Core (see the directory) | No |
| A recorded first receive address | Proves the rebuilt wallet is the right one before anything is signed | No, but private |
If the descriptor is lost
- All N xpubs are needed. With M seeds you can re-derive those M xpubs, but not the others. Unchained: "all of the xpubs are required to access the funds"; if any key is lost and the configuration is missing, "a subset of the remaining keys will not be enough to recover the funds" (Unchained). So a lost descriptor turns "any 2 of 3" into "all 3, or nothing".
- Then everything else must be guessed. Threshold, script type (nested or native SegWit, Taproot), each key's derivation path (BIP48's default for native SegWit multisig is
m/48'/0'/0'/2'; BIP48) and key order. Descriptors distinguishmulti(), which keeps keys in the order listed, fromsortedmulti(), which sorts them; the two give different addresses (BIP383). - Where a copy may survive. Coordinator software on an old computer may still hold the configuration; a collaborative custody provider normally has one; a signing device on which the wallet was registered may be able to show or export it (check its manual). Look for these first, but don't plan on them.
Steps for an heir or executor
- Gather the descriptor and the letter of instruction; confirm the threshold (for example 2-of-3) and which keys are where.
- Install a coordinator from its official site and import the descriptor (file, QR or text). Check that the checksum is accepted and the first receive address matches the one recorded.
- Connect M signing devices, or restore M seeds onto hardware wallets, never by typing words into the computer.
- Send a small test transaction first, then the rest. If a key was lost or exposed, move everything to a new multisig with fresh backups.
Our printable multisig configuration record has space for the threshold, every fingerprint and path, and where each descriptor copy is kept, and no secrets. See also descriptor backups and multisig across vendors.
Pros
- With the descriptor, any compatible coordinator can rebuild the wallet
- One lost key is survivable
Cons
- Without it, one lost key can be fatal
- The descriptor is private and must be copied to several places
Common pitfalls
- Trusting that "2 of 3 seeds" is enough
- The only descriptor copy on one laptop
- Not recording
multiorsortedmultiand the paths
Expert & community advice
- Keep a descriptor copy with every key (Stack Exchange: "keep it with each one of the cosigners/ seed backups"; source)
- Rehearse a full recovery in a new coordinator once a year
Codex32 (BIP-93) Expert
BIP-93, by Leon Olsson Curr, Pearlwort Sneed and Andrew Poelstra (status: Draft), encodes a BIP32 master seed in a bech32-like alphabet with strong error correction, and supports Shamir sharing that you can compute entirely by hand using paper volvelles (rotating wheels) and worksheets (secretcodex32.com).
Pros
- No electronic device needed to create, split, checksum or verify
- Excellent error detection/correction
- Auditable mathematics
Cons
- Hours of careful manual work
- Limited wallet support (see below) — check before using
- Not compatible with BIP39 words
Common pitfalls
- Arithmetic errors on worksheets (the project itself warns to practise with dummy data)
- Leaving worksheets around — they contain secret data
Expert advice
- Treat as an expert/enthusiast tool; pair with a wallet that natively imports codex32 shares
Wallet support, October 2026. COLDCARD firmware 5.6.3 (Mk4/Mk5) and 1.5.3Q (Q), released on 1 October 2026, can generate 128- or 256-bit codex32 wallets, import a complete secret, split the active wallet into 2–9 shares and recover from a threshold of shares (Coinkite, COLDCARD docs). Bitcoin Knots accepts codex32 secrets or threshold shares through importdescriptors (Knots notes). Sparrow 2.4.0 (February 2026) imports the complete secret (share s) only; share recovery and generation are not yet supported (release notes). The project website's note that no wallets support codex32 dates from September 2022.
Seed XOR Expert
Created by Coinkite for COLDCARD (seedxor.com). A BIP39 seed is split into 2 or more parts that are each themselves valid BIP39 seeds; XOR-ing all parts together gives the real seed. All parts are required (N-of-N).
Pros
- Each part looks like an ordinary seed — can hold decoy funds
- Can be computed on paper with worksheets
- Plain BIP39 output, works on any wallet once combined
Cons
- No redundancy: lose one part, lose everything
- Must store backups of each part to compensate
Common pitfalls
- Treating it like 2-of-3 — it isn't
- Forgetting which seeds are parts and in what scheme
Advice
- Duplicate each part (e.g. two copies of each in different places)
- COLDCARD's Seed Vault can collect parts one by one
Seed in one place, passphrase in another Intermediate
The simplest split: the words are in location A, the passphrase in location B. A thief needs both. But it is 2-of-2 — lose either and the funds are gone — so each piece usually needs its own duplicate, ending up with 4 items in at least 2–3 places.
Why you must not cut a BIP39 phrase in half Beginner
Each half reveals real information. Someone holding words 1–12 of a 24-word phrase only has to search about 2124 possibilities instead of 2256 — still out of reach today, but you have quietly given away more than half your security margin. For a 12-word phrase split 6 + 6, about 262 possibilities remain, which is within reach of determined attackers. See the numbers.
Worse, a "1–16 / 9–24 / 1–8 + 17–24" three-way overlap scheme (sometimes suggested online to fake 2-of-3) leaves each piece revealing two-thirds of the phrase.
Further reading: r/CryptoCurrency analysis · SLIP-39 rationale
Do instead: use SLIP-39, multisig, or seed + passphrase.
The numbers: naive splitting versus SLIP-39 Intermediate Expert
Each BIP39 word carries 11 bits. A 24-word phrase is 256 bits of randomness plus an 8-bit checksum; a 12-word phrase is 128 bits plus 4 (BIP39). So someone who finds part of a phrase only has to search the missing words, and the checksum lets them discard most wrong guesses cheaply. The figures below are our own arithmetic from those numbers (missing words × 11, less the checksum bits).
| What the finder holds | Missing words | Guesses left (approx.) | Compared with guessing the whole phrase |
|---|---|---|---|
| Words 1–12 of 24 (halves) | 12 | 2124 | 2132 times easier than 2256 |
| 16 of 24 words (an overlapping "2-of-3" piece) | 8 | 280 | 2176 times easier |
| Words 1–6 of 12 (halves) | 6 | 262 | 266 times easier than 2128 |
| 8 of 12 words (an overlapping "2-of-3" piece) | 4 | 240 (about 1.1 trillion) | 288 times easier |
| One SLIP-39 share of a 2-of-3 set (or any number below the threshold) | — | 2128 or 2256: unchanged | No easier: fewer than the threshold "does not leak information about the master secret" (SLIP-39) |
- Reading the table. 2124 is still far beyond brute force today, but the margin is gone for no benefit: you still need both halves. 240 is small enough that a determined attacker with ordinary hardware could plausibly search it, even though each guess costs 2,048 rounds of PBKDF2 (BIP39). We have not costed attacks in money or time, because that depends on hardware and on how many address types an attacker checks.
- The 16-of-24 case matches the 80-bit figure in Andreas Antonopoulos's worked example on the comparison page.
- Why SLIP-39 differs. Shamir's scheme makes every combination of fewer than the threshold equally consistent with every possible secret, so a share on its own is worthless to a thief (information-theoretic security). It also keeps recovery tolerance: in 2-of-3 any one share can be lost. A passphrase on top still protects you if a threshold of shares is ever gathered by the wrong person.
- Telling sets apart. Every share in a SLIP-39 set carries the same random 15-bit identifier, which is why shares of one set begin with the same two words and shares of one group with the same three (SLIP-39). Shares from different sets cannot be mixed, even with the same threshold.
Proprietary "sharding" products Intermediate
Several products split backups in their own formats: Ledger Recover (encrypted shares with three companies), Foundation Passport Prime (2-of-3 KeyCards + phone share), Cypherock X1 (device + four cards), Tangem (duplicate cards), Bitkey (2-of-3 with phone and server). They can be excellent for usability, but recovery depends on that vendor's tools continuing to exist. Ask: "If this company vanished tomorrow, could my heirs still recover with open-source software?" See recovery services.
Compatibility at a glance Intermediate
"Supported" changes with firmware and app versions. This table lists only support confirmed in the linked documentation on 24 October 2026; absence from the table does not mean a wallet lacks support. Always test a restore on the wallet you plan to rely on.
| Format | Created by (examples) | Import confirmed in (examples) | Passphrase | Main interoperability risk |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| BIP39 | Nearly all hardware and software wallets | Nearly all | Optional BIP39 passphrase | Different default paths and address types between wallets |
| SLIP-39 | Trezor Safe 3, Safe 5, Safe 7 and Model T | Trezor lists Rabby, Electrum, Sparrow, BlueWallet, Wasabi and NuFi, plus OneKey and Keystone hardware (Trezor) | SLIP-39's own passphrase, printable ASCII only | Not readable by BIP39-only devices; newer "extendable" shares need up-to-date importers |
| Codex32 | COLDCARD Mk4/Mk5 firmware 5.6.3 and Q 1.5.3Q (October 2026); by hand with the paper booklet | COLDCARD (secret and 2–9 shares); Bitcoin Knots via importdescriptors; Sparrow 2.4.0 (complete secret only, not shares) | None: COLDCARD notes a BIP39 passphrase cannot be applied | Very few wallets; share recovery still missing in most |
| Electrum seed | Electrum 2.0+ | Electrum (check any other wallet's documentation before relying on it) | See Electrum | Looks like BIP39 but is not |
| aezeed | LND | LND-based wallets | Own passphrase (the default is "aezeed") | Looks like a 24-word BIP39 phrase but is not |
| Seed XOR parts | COLDCARD; by hand | Any BIP39 wallet once the parts are combined | Optional BIP39 passphrase on the combined seed | All parts needed (N-of-N) |
| Monero 25-word | Monero wallets | Monero wallets | Wallet-specific | Not BIP39; Monero only |
Sources: Trezor SLIP-39 FAQ, SLIP-39, COLDCARD Codex32 docs, COLDCARD 5.6.3 release (1 October 2026), Sparrow 2.4.0, Bitcoin Knots codex32 notes, Electrum, aezeed, Moneropedia
Which wallets can restore SLIP-39 shares? Checked against each maker's own documentation Intermediate
Trezor lists Rabby, Electrum, Sparrow, BlueWallet, Wasabi and NuFi software wallets and OneKey and Keystone hardware wallets as supporting its Multi-share Backup (Trezor). We checked the makers' own documentation or release notes on 25 October 2026. "Not verified" means we did not find the maker's own statement; it does not mean the wallet lacks support.
| Wallet | Type | Create shares | Restore shares | What the maker says |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Trezor Safe 3, Safe 5, Safe 7, Model T | Hardware | Yes | Yes | Single-share and multi-share; 20-word single-share backups from June 2024 (firmware 2.7.2) can be upgraded to multi-share (Trezor) |
| Keystone 3 Pro | Hardware | Yes | Yes | "Supports the importing and creation of SLIP39 Shamir Backups" (Keystone support); firmware 2.2.6 (6 August 2025) is "compatible with the updated SLIP-39 protocol" (Keystone changelog). In July 2024 a Trezor Safe 5 20-word backup failed to import on Keystone because of the new "extendable" flag (Trezor forum, July 2024) |
| OneKey Pro | Hardware | Yes | Yes | Supported "since version 4.15.0"; the guide shows 20-word shares (OneKey help centre, 9 March 2026). We did not verify 33-word support |
| Electrum | Desktop software | Not documented | Yes | "Allow restoring from SLIP39 seeds" (4.1.5, July 2021); "support latest revision of SLIP-39 mnemonic spec (to restore)" (4.5.5, 30 May 2024) (Electrum release notes) |
| Sparrow | Desktop software | Not documented | Yes | "Support recovering SLIP39 mnemonic shares (File > New Wallet > Software Wallet)" in 2.0.0, 18 September 2024 (Sparrow 2.0.0) |
| Rabby, BlueWallet, Wasabi, NuFi | Software | Not verified | Listed by Trezor; we did not find the makers' own statements in this check | |
| Ledger, BitBox02 | Hardware | No SLIP-39 option documented | Treat as BIP39 only (see SLIP-39 above); not re-checked in this pass | |
Electrum and Sparrow restore shares as a software wallet: the reassembled secret then lives on an internet-connected computer. That is a reasonable emergency route if every hardware option has gone, but treat the funds as exposed afterwards and move them to a new wallet with a fresh backup. Restoring onto a hardware wallet that supports SLIP-39 keeps the secret off the computer.
Interoperability pitfalls Expert
- Converting between schemes. BIP-93 explains that turning BIP39 words into codex32 is one-way, because BIP39 hashes the words, and produces an unwieldy 512-bit seed. SLIP-39 shares cannot be converted into codex32 shares because the two use different mathematical fields. The BIP's authors do not recommend interconversion: generate a fresh seed and move the coins (BIP-93).
- Passphrase characters. BIP39 normalises passphrases to Unicode NFKD, while SLIP-39 allows only printable ASCII (codes 32–126). A passphrase with accents or emoji may not move between schemes or keyboards. Plain ASCII is the safest choice.
- Upgrading Trezor backups. Only 20-word single-share backups made on firmware 2.7.2 or later can become multi-share without moving funds. Older SLIP-39 and all BIP39 backups need a new wallet (Trezor).
- Look-alike phrases. Electrum and aezeed phrases use BIP39's English words. A BIP39-only wallet will reject them or open a different, empty wallet.
- Non-English wordlists. BIP39 strongly discourages them because most wallets support only English, and a translated phrase is a different wallet.
- Extended key prefixes. ypub and zpub (SLIP-132) are a convention, not part of BIP32. Descriptors state the script type explicitly and are the more portable record.
Pros
- Sticking to BIP39 English plus a descriptor gives the widest recovery options
- SLIP-39 and codex32 add real error detection that BIP39 lacks
Cons
- Every extra format narrows the list of wallets that can recover you
- Format support can depend on firmware versions your heirs will not know
Common pitfalls
- Assuming a wallet "supports Shamir" means it supports your shares
- Mixing share sets from two different backups (SLIP-39 rejects shares with different identifiers)
- Using a non-ASCII passphrase, then moving to SLIP-39
Expert & community advice
- Test-restore on a second wallet from a different maker before funding
- Record format, version and app in the inventory
- Re-check support after major firmware updates
Descriptors and the BIP380 family Expert
An output descriptor is a short text that says exactly which scripts and keys a wallet uses, for example "native SegWit, this xpub, these paths". BIP380 defines the general syntax and an optional 8-character checksum after #. Related BIPs define the script types: 381 (non-SegWit), 382 (SegWit), 383 (multisig), 384 (combo), 385 (raw and addr), 386 (Taproot) and 387 (Taproot multisig). BIP389 (Draft) adds multipath expressions such as <0;1> so one descriptor covers receive and change. BIP388 (Complete) defines wallet policies, a compact descriptor form that signing devices can register and display.
Bitcoin Core has created descriptor wallets by default since version 23.0 (release notes); its descriptor documentation lists the supported expressions.
Pros
- Removes guesswork about paths and script types
- Essential and sufficient (with the seeds) to rebuild a multisig wallet
- The checksum catches copying errors
Cons
- Reveals every address of the wallet, so it is private
- Long strings that are easy to mistype by hand
Common pitfalls
- Backing up multisig seeds but not the descriptor
- Keeping one copy only, at one site
- Including xprv (private) keys in a descriptor you store as "not secret"
Expert & community advice
- Store the descriptor with every key of a multisig, as on our multisig configuration record
- Keep the checksum; verify it after restoring
- See also asset management: descriptors
Primary sources for this page
- SLIP-39
- BIP-93 codex32
- BIP380 descriptors
- BIP389 multipath
- BIP388 wallet policies
- Bitcoin Core descriptors
- Trezor SLIP-39 FAQ
- COLDCARD Codex32
- Sparrow 2.4.0
- Bitcoin Knots codex32
- Electrum seeds
- LND aezeed
- Monero mnemonic
See also sources: core guides.
Last reviewed: · Educational information only — verify current details with official sources.